Polish final report on Smoleńsk aircrash

He needed the time to analyse the situation , do you think that the synoptic conditions are given in normal words or rather you get parameters from which you have to figure out real conditions .

The light`s warning system was completely obscured by trees, which were several meters high above the norm . On the path of a runaway high trees were growing, which was not compatible with international rules . After the crach the pathway and lights system were cleared out of the trees .

Controllers confirmed him that the plane was on the safe altitude , he was deprived of the proper information of the plane`s altitude due to the lack of current baromiter conditions which should be given by Smolensk meteorologist on duty in order to set up his altimeter on board of the plane .

The descent below minimum descent altitude (MDA), with an excessive rate of descent, in atmospheric conditions which prevented visual contact with the runway. The decision to go-around was taken too late. This led to collision with terrain, the destruction of the left wing, consequently loss of control and loss of the aircraft.

Contributing factors were:

- unverified high barometric altimeter setting during a non-precision approach
- lack of reaction to TAWS warnings
- attempt to go around by pressing TOGA, which however was not armed
- tower ATC attempting to talk the aircraft down although the aircraft's position was outside approach limits, the ATC instructions re-inforcing the crew's belief they were conducting a proper approach
- failure of tower to inform the crew about being too low and instructing the crew to maintain level flight too late
- inappropriate/insufficient training of the crew on TU-154M aircraft

Unfavourable factors were:

- improper crew cooperation causing excessive load on the commander during the last phase of flight
- inadequate flight preparation
- insufficient knowledge of functions and limits of their aircraft by the crew
- improper monitoring of each other by all flight crew members, lack of corrective actions to mistakes
- incorrect selection of crew to perform the flight, íncorrect task assignment to crew members
- incorrect supervision of flight crew training
- the operator's failure to set criteria for stabilised approach, runway and environmental requirements for various approach types, and crew cooperation
- the operator's failure to ensure practical experience, especially at the Smolensk North aerodrome

Apparently it was safe enough for the Presidential security detail to clear it. The crew apparently thought it safe enough when they landed a couple of days before.

Strange that the same pilot managed to land there three days before in the same plane at the same airport, without problem - if it was really so dangerous, how come they managed then?

Are you serious about this question? If I close your eyes, can you still walk easily on the narrow path that you walk everyday?

At the end of the day - even if there was systematic institutional failures - it doesn't excuse the commander.

he crew apparently thought it safe enough

Are you serious about this question? If I close your eyes, can you still walk easily on the narrow path that you walk everyday?

Strange that the same pilot managed to land there three days before in the same plane at the same airport, without problem - if it was really so dangerous, how come they managed then?

Yes that all very nice, you are saying that if a plane loose engine and a wing it is still is fault of a commander.

Do you expect form the pilot to complain about the height of the trees , they would laugh at him , don`t be naive that any pilot would do it . It was up to his superiors to decide and give him actual conditions of the aerodrome , those ones he was handed over were false . Read the segment in the report how much of the area was covered by trees exceeding the norm .

It is the best idea ( politically justified ) to put all the blame on the pilot, as he is dead and those responsible are still alive .

If I had the President, as well as many other VIP's on my back, then I wouldn't take the risk to begin with.

“Few day before the planned visit of Lech a Kaczynski in Katyn, landed the head of the Russian government Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Donald Tusk, with the help of particularly delivered a radar device, on 7 April on the Smolensker airport. On Saturday 10 April 2010 the equipment had disappeared” - Julia Latynina commentated on Thursday in “the Moscow Times”. Nevertheless it added that one had prepared a strategy during the Tusk of visit also, as one lets the visit of the Polish president Lech Kaczynski treat by Russian authorities “as redundant” can.

Viktor Yanukovych’s victory in the presidential election once again raises doubt about the basic premise of democracy: that the people are capable of choosing their own leader. Unfortunately, only wealthy people are truly capable of electing their leaders in a responsible manner.[13]

Colonel Bartosz Stroinski, which on 7 April as a commander Tupolev Prime Minister Tusk flew to Smolensk said that the crew accomplished the landing with the help of the standard equipment local military airport.

The radar altimeter doesn't require the pressure.

Here's the outcome of the Polish report:

Polish mistakes were crushing, though, and directly contributed to the accident.

His altimeters were not showing him proper height due to the lack of the information from Smolensk meteo about the current air pressure .

Why was the pilot not informed about the fact that the aerodrome was not equipped with ILS system and the system was removed just days before ?

Yes the official conclusions , but if you have brains you can figure out something else, if you read the report carefully . Your conclusions might be very different .

Why didn't you say simply this "yes, Smolensk airport isn't so good airport and weather condition/fog made things worse.."

They were using radio and barometer altimeter . What do you mean then ?

The controllers were giving him also false data and they were confirming him about his proper altitude which was false . His altimeters were not showing him proper height due to the lack of the information from Smolensk meteo about the current air pressure .

Yes the official conclusions , but if you have brains you can figure out something else, if you read the report carefully . Your conclusions might be very different .

Why was the pilot not informed about the fact that the aerodrome was not equipped with ILS system and the system was removed just days before ?

Given air pressure was false .

That`s the fact , but how could the commander communicate with the controllers, if the TAWS alarm was on making unbearable noise .

That is very disputable , as some experts state that the system was not even switched on as the pilot wanted to pull the machine manually .

Don`t you think it was too much for one commander .

radar altimeter is the same thing as a radio altimeter. if you read the cvr transcript, you can see that they were using it, and the report states it as well. apparently minsk ATC gave qfe at 1500m.

In the opinion of the Committee, errors of LZC ( landing zone crew ) of Smolensk controlling tower and deviations from principles of servicing landing approaches using radar equipment involved the following::

1) informing the crew about the aircraft‘s correct position ―on course and on glide path while their position in reference to RWY center line and glide path was outside of the acceptable deviation zone;

2) communicating information about distance to RWY 26 500-600 m in advance;

3) no reaction (for a period of 10 s) to the crew‘s continued descent beyond maximum acceptable deviation (-30‘).

4) delayed issue of the command „Горизонт, сто один‖ (Horizon, one zero one) to the Tu-154M crew.


In circumstances where, during final landing approach, LZC experienced difficulty keeping a visual on the aircraft on the glide path or course display, he should have immediately duly notified the aircraft crew.

LZC notifying the Tu-154M crew of the aircraft’s correct position ―on course, on glide path contrary to its actual position, may have reassured the crew about the correct execution of approach, and correct flight trajectory.

LZC‘s priority was to ensure safe performance of landing approaches by aircraft crews on April 10th 2010.

They missed principles and made many above mentioned mistakes

The quality of his performance was a crucial element in the circumstances of flight under analysis.

Due to the Russian party not having provided important documents, and not having permitted a repeated interrogation of the ATC air traffic controller Group, the Committee based its analysis primarily on the actual flight trajectory of the Tu-154M aircraft, and on voice recordings at Inner ATC Post and in the aircraft cockpit.

Very important failure of Russian investigators .

Lack of LZC‘s reaction to further deviation of the aircraft below the glide path was an important factor in the accident.

It is impossible to speculate what the crew‘s reaction would have been if they had heard the command from LZC landing zone crew ordering the approach to be aborted, at the time when they were moving out of the area of maximum acceptable deviation from the glide path. Such command, however, should have been communicated to the crew by the LZC at least 10 s before it actually had been.


This simple few words from the report contain the actual cause of the crash .

But this radar altimeter is not inside the plane . The controlling tower is equipped with such device . This radar altimeter indicated the plane`s altitude on 1500 meters above the ground and such data was passed on to the Polish commander by the LZC crew in Smolensk . That was a major fault and the most crucial factor of the crash .

A radar altimeter, radio altimeter, low range radio altimeter (LRRA) or simply RA measures altitude above the terrain presently beneath an aircraft or spacecraft. This type of altimeter provides the distance between the plane and the ground directly below it, as opposed to a barometric altimeter which provides the distance above a pre-determined datum, usually sea level.

( yes , that`s the fact, the other fact is that the device was not set up ( Smolensk aerodrome data should be put in memory storage of it before entering the plane ) it was up to other people to put in such data, but not the pilot ( maybe technicians ) .. How would the monitoring be carried on by the pilot, if he was deprived of proper air pressure data , which was not delivered by Smolensk meteo due to lack of proper equipment . Given air pressure was false .

That`s the fact , but how could the commander communicate with the controllers, if the TAWS alarm was on making unbearable noise . The plane`s altitude was 1500 meters according to controllers , he couldn`t verify this with plane`s barometer at the same time , so he believed the plane was positioned at such altitude.

That is very disputable , as some experts state that the system was not even switched on as the pilot wanted to pull the machine manually .

That was Smolensk air traffic control crew fault .

During the difficult flight , it should be a cockpit silence , while the pilot had to talk over the radio with the tower in Russian language , checking radio and barometer altimeters , making the proper assumptions about the weather conditions , speaking with DWL commander and protocol`s director . , everything occurring during the difficult conditions . Don`t you think it was too much for one commander .

But this radar altimeter is not inside the plane . The controlling tower is equipped with such device . This radar altimeter indicated the plane`s altitude on 1500 meters above the ground and such data was passed on to the Polish commander by the LZC crew in Smolensk . That was a major fault and the most crucial factor of the crash .